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IDAHO’S NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAP ON
WHISTLEBLOWERS: ADDING ANOTHER CLAIM TO THE
LIST OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CAPS IN IDAHO
BROOKE KENNEY*
ABSTRACT
Whistleblower protections have grown in popularity throughout the United
States and have occasionally obtained massive jury verdicts. This was the case in
Eller v. Idaho State Police where the jury returned a verdict of $1.5 million in
noneconomic damages. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho held that
whistleblowers could obtain noneconomic damages and no statutory cap on
noneconomic damages applied to the whistleblower claims. This was a major
decision because it expanded the scope of remedies available to whistleblowers.
The defendants settled for $1.29 million. In direct response to the Supreme Court
of Idaho’s decision in Eller, Idaho legislators enacted House Bill 583 limiting
noneconomic damages for whistleblowers to the noneconomic damage cap in
section 6-1603 of the Idaho Code. This bill adds whistleblowers to the list of
claimants subject to the limitations set forth in Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap.
Noneconomic damage caps harm those with the most severe injuries—
plaintiffs with legitimate claims of noneconomic harm surpassing the cap. These
plaintiffs, who are hurt the most, are left unable to fully recover their damages.
Damage caps also impact settlement discussions in favor of defendants,
disproportionately affect women, and are unconstitutional in violation of equal
protection and the right to a jury trial. For these reasons, the Idaho Legislature
should cease enacting noneconomic damage caps, and the constitutionality of the
cap should be challenged again in Idaho.
In practice, Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap, section 6-1603, puts a ceiling
on the amount of damages recoverable for otherwise meritorious claims for relief
in medical malpractice, personal injury, and now, pursuant to House Bill 583,
whistleblower cases. However, the cap has an exception for the most egregious
cases to override the cap’s limitations: a plaintiff is able to fully recover and surpass
the cap if the tortfeasor’s conduct was reckless or felonious in personal injury and
medical malpractice cases. This exception is not available to whistleblowers. Thus,
the noneconomic damage cap specifically harms whistleblowers because it does
not afford them with the ability to override the cap’s limitations. The statute is
discriminatory and may be a violation of equal protection because it treats
whistleblowers differently than other plaintiffs subject to the cap.
If the legislature is going to cap whistleblower damages, it should treat
whistleblowing plaintiffs the same as personal injury and medical malpractice
plaintiffs. Whistleblowers should be afforded the opportunity to override the cap.
The legislature should either allow whistleblowers to recover in full or give them
the ability to override the cap for the most egregious cases. This will ensure
whistleblowers are fully compensated for the actual injuries suffered and
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encourage whistleblowers to come forward with evidence of wrongdoing despite
the risk of retaliation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The significance and meaning of one’s employment are different for
everyone. For many Americans, work is a chore, a source of stress, a burden to be
borne; but work can also be a liberator, a source of security, a benefit of livelihood.
People are free to choose the area of work they want to pursue, and in return, jobs
become an important piece of one’s identity. A person’s job occupies a central role
in his or her life and gives him or her a sense of self, security, and well-being. For
these reasons, jobs are inextricably linked to who someone is, what he/she is
interested in, and his/her status in society.
Due to the importance of employment, problems at work can lead to a
deterioration in one’s mental health. Therefore, when an employee is retaliated
against for reporting an employer’s wrongdoing it can have severe impacts on the
emotional and mental well-being of the employee. In recent years, states have
become increasingly active in enacting statutes protecting employees from
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retaliation.1 Idaho protects public employees in the Idaho Protection of Public
Employees Act.2 In Eller v. Idaho State Police, the Idaho Supreme Court expanded
the scope of remedies available to whistleblowers under the Idaho Protection of
Public Employees Act by ruling no caps on noneconomic damages apply to
whistleblowers.3 Brandon Eller, the plaintiff who blew the whistle, was able to fully
recover damages for the legitimate emotional distress he endured due to the
retaliation he experienced at work.4
In the wake of that important whistleblower case, the Idaho State Legislature
enacted House Bill 583 the following year severely limiting noneconomic damages
for whistleblowers.5 This bill adds to the list of damage caps the state has imposed
on otherwise meritorious claims for relief. Noneconomic damage caps do not allow
plaintiffs to fully recover, negatively impact settlement negotiations for plaintiffs,
and disproportionately affect women, children, elderly, and low-income persons.6
Additionally, noneconomic damage caps may be unconstitutional because they
impermissibly discriminate depending on the type of tortfeasor and should be
challenged again in Idaho.
This Note examines noneconomic damages, the tort reform movement to cap
these damages, and how the whistleblower case, Eller v. Idaho State Police, sparked
new legislation to cap damages for whistleblowers. Specifically, Part I describes
noneconomic damages and their importance in the justice system. Part II describes
the tort reform movement to cap noneconomic damages, Idaho’s noneconomic
damage caps, and the leading arguments opposing damage caps. Part III of this Note
introduces Idaho’s Whistleblower Act, the Eller case, and how this decision
expanded the scope of remedies for whistleblowers. Part IV introduces the Idaho
legislature’s decision to cap whistleblower’s noneconomic damages. It also
provides an overview of the legislature’s rationale for enacting House Bill 583, the
harmful effects of the cap on whistleblowers, and an alternative approach to
capping whistleblower damages. Part V explains how new claims challenging the
constitutionality of damage caps in Idaho should arise. The Note concludes with a
recommendation that Idaho legislators should reconsider the enactment of
noneconomic damage caps.

1. MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 493–94 (3d
ed. 2017).
2. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2101–2109 (1994).
3. Eller v. Idaho State Police, 443 P.3d 161, 171, 165 Idaho 147, 157 (2019).
4. Id. at 169, 165 Idaho at 155.
5. H.B. 583, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
6. See discussion infra Section II.B Harmful Effects of Tort Reform.
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II. NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
The basic goal of damages is to compensate for harm.7 Damages for tort
claimants can be broadly separated into two categories: economic damages and
noneconomic damages.8 Economic damages are out-of-pocket costs the plaintiff
incurs.9 However, in many cases, some degree of pain, suffering, or emotional
distress occurs that is not adequately compensated by economic damages alone. 10
This is where noneconomic damages come in to assist economic damages in fully
compensating the plaintiff. As the name implies, noneconomic damages
compensate for harms that are not easily measured in dollars.11
In Idaho, categories of noneconomic damages include, but are not limited to:
“pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, disability or disfigurement
incurred by the injured party; emotional distress; loss of society and
companionship; loss of consortium; or destruction or impairment of the parentchild relationship.”12 Unlike quantifiable economic injuries, such as loss of income
or expenses caused by physical injury, noneconomic damages are more difficult to
calculate because how much a person has suffered mentally or emotionally is not
easily quantified, the law does not provide clear guidelines on how to quantify
them, and the amount given is unpredictably determined by the jury based on the
evidence at trial.13 Therefore, states have varied in the methods used to calculate
noneconomic damages and have debated whether such harms should be

7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
8. Lisa M. Ruda, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff: Heeding the Warning
Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197, 199 (1993).
9. Id.
10. See Edward C. Martin, Limiting Damages for Pain and Suffering: Arguments Pro and Con, 10
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 317 (1986); see also DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES,
159 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 5th ed. 2019) (“Damage awards for pain and suffering, even when
apparently generous, may well under-compensate victims.”).
11. Martin, supra note 10, at 321.
12. IDAHO CODE § 6-1601(5) (2020).
13. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Nature and Impact of the “Tort Reform” Movement, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
437, 492 (2006); Ruda, supra note 8, at 202–03; see also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb
in Tort: Scheduling Pain and Suffering, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908, 912 (1989):
Whatever the categories of non-economic damages allowed in a given
jurisdiction, the law provides no objective benchmarks for valuing them. As one
commentator notes, “Courts have usually been content to say
that pain and suffering damages should amount to ‘fair compensation’ or a
‘reasonable amount,’ without any more definite guide.” Jurors are not to apply a
kind of compensatory “golden rule” and ask what they themselves would want in
compensation if they were in the shoes of the plaintiff; nor are they to measure
what amount a volunteer might demand to undergo equivalent suffering, for
there is no market in pain. Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 8.1, at 545 (1973)).
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compensated at all.14 But the difficulty in assessing the appropriate amount of
noneconomic damages is not a suitable reason to discredit them, and the debate
over whether persons should be awarded noneconomic damages is settled. 15 Every
American jurisdiction has recognized the importance of noneconomic damages by
awarding them in some circumstances.16
The basic principle of awarding compensatory damages is to restore the
plaintiff to his rightful position.17 A plaintiff’s rightful position is “the position [the
plaintiff] rightfully would have come to but for defendant’s wrong.” 18 Noneconomic
damages are necessary to return the plaintiff to his or her rightful position in
circumstances where the injured plaintiff is not fully compensated with economic
damages alone. In fact, many tort victims are not adequately compensated by
economic damages alone and need noneconomic damages to fully recover to their
rightful position.19
Noneconomic damages are important in the employment context. Loss of
one’s job, discrimination, retaliation, or sexual harassment in the workplace are
examples of situations that can be extremely traumatic and may give rise to
legitimate claims of emotional distress.
Despite their importance in tort cases, noneconomic damages for emotional
distress have historically been marginalized and labeled as “arbitrary.”20 For
example, cases have disregarded emotional harms by stating that these claims are
only brought by ultrasensitive persons or those with a preexisting disposition for
emotional injuries.21 Despite tort law’s marginalization of emotional distress, these
claims are valid and those who suffer emotional harms are deserving of
compensation. In sum, noneconomic damages are an essential component of
compensatory damages and assist economic damages in fully compensating an
injured plaintiff to their rightful position.

14. Martin, supra note 10, at 322–25; see also Amanda E. Haiduc, A Tale of Three Damage Caps:
Too Much, Too Little and Finally Just Right, 40 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 825, 830 (1989).
15. Martin, supra note 10, at 318.
16. Ruda, supra note 8, at 200.
17. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 9 (quoting U.S. v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958)).
18. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 12.
19. See LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 12–15, 131–39.
20. Ruda, supra note 8, at 202–05 (proponents assert noneconomic damages are “arbitrary”
because they rely on jury sympathies rather than the claim’s merits and are determined by jury
speculation).
21. Ruda, supra note 8, at 213–15.
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III. THE TORT REFORM MOVEMENT
A. History of the Tort Reform Movement
Noneconomic damages have been upheld in every American jurisdiction.22
However, many believe that the unpredictable nature of noneconomic damage
awards threaten the liability insurance system that funds a majority of tort
compensation.23 In the 1970s, a crisis in rising healthcare costs was believed to be
caused, in part, by “out of control jury verdicts” of noneconomic damages coupled
with the increasing amount and availability of these awards.24 Tort reformists
blamed the healthcare insurance crisis on noneconomic damage awards.25 Various
proposals were made by tort reformists to curtail the rising healthcare and
insurance costs.26 Some of the most common proposals included: limiting recovery
for noneconomic damages, abolishing punitive damages, and shortening the
statute of limitations.27 Since the tort reform movement began in the 1970s, every
state has enacted at least one of their proposals.28 Of the proposals, fixed limits on
noneconomic damages, also known as damage caps, were the most prevalent.29
The effort to put fixed limits on recovery for noneconomic damages was, and
continues to be, at the center of the tort reform movement. 30
Noneconomic damage cap statutes are enacted by the legislature and limit
recovery by defining the maximum amount recoverable.31 In other words, these
caps create a ceiling for which a plaintiff’s recovery on noneconomic damages
cannot surpass—even if the jury awards an amount greater than the cap. But if

22. Ruda, supra note 8, at 200.
23. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 13, at 917.
24. See, e.g., Eller, 443 P.3d at 161, 165 Idaho at 147 (jury initially awarded $1.5 million in
noneconomic damages for emotional distress); Martin, supra note 10, at 325; Catherine M. Sharkey,
Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 406 (2005).
25. Malpractice and Its Effects on the Healthcare Industry, TEX. A&M UNIV. CORPUS CHRISTI (Sept.
27,
2016),
https://online.tamucc.edu/articles/malpractice-and-its-effects-on-the-healthcareindustry.aspx; see also MARTIN D. WEISS ET AL., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CAPS: THE IMPACT OF NON-ECONOMIC
DAMAGE CAPS ON PHYSICIAN PREMIUMS, CLAIMS PAYOUT LEVELS, AND AVAILABILITY OF COVERAGE (2003),
https://www.
floridasupremecourt.org/content/download/242740/file/SC111148%20Medical%20Malpractice%20Caps
.%20Weiss%20Ratings.pdf.
26. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 153.
27. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 153.
28. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 153–54.
29. Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the Elderly, 53
EMORY L.J. 1263, 1264 (2004).
30. Id.
31. W. McDonald Plosser, United States: Sky’s the Limit? A 50-State Survey of Damages Caps and
the Collateral Source Rule, MONDAQ (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/insurancelaws-and-products
/762574/sky39s-the-limit-a-50-state-survey-of-damages-caps-and-the-collateral-source-rule.
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noneconomic damages are needed to fully compensate the plaintiff, why did tort
reformists suggest capping noneconomic damages and not economic damages?
Tort reformists focused their efforts on noneconomic damages because these
losses are more speculative, not readily quantifiable, and historically marginalized
compared to economic losses.32
Initially, legislatures following the tort reform movement put damage caps
solely on medical malpractice claims to decrease healthcare insurance costs.33 But
as tort reform grew in popularity, many states limited the juries’ discretion to award
damages by enacting caps on claims other than medical malpractice, such as
personal injury or generally for all tort claims.34 Today, noneconomic damage caps
are enacted in twenty-three states, including Idaho, for various claims such as:
medical malpractice,35 products liability,36 personal injury,37 or general tort-related
claims.38 The tort reform movement began in response to the healthcare crisis, but
it has escalated beyond its original purpose and now imposes limitations on a
variety of meritorious claims for relief.
B. Harmful Effects of Tort Reform
Noneconomic damage caps are extremely controversial. 39 On one hand, the
proponents of the tort reform movement have focused on the difficulty in
measuring noneconomic damages and the punitive nature of imposing high
noneconomic damage liability.40 Tort reformists believe noneconomic damages are
subjective, unpredictable, and should be limited or even abolished.41 Additionally,
there is a belief that juries tend to be overly sympathetic to victims and award a

32. See Haiduc, supra note 14, at 830–31.
33. Bovbjerg, supra note13, at 908–09.
34. LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 154.
35. Fact Sheet: Caps on Compensatory Damages: A State Law Summary, CTR. FOR JUST. &
DEMOCRACY 1, 2 (Aug. 22, 2020), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-compensatory-damagesstate-law-summary. Twenty-three states have noneconomic damage caps in medical malpractice cases.
Id.
36. Id. Eight states have noneconomic damage caps in products liability cases. Id.
37. Id. at 1. Eight states have noneconomic damage caps in personal injury or general tort cases.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Martin, supra note 10, at 329, 337–38; see also Ruda, supra note 8, at 206. States have not
responded to the tort reform movement uniformly. Ruda, supra note 8, at 206.
40. Martin, supra note 10, at 329, 331–32.
41. Hubbard, supra note 13, at 493.
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windfall judgment to the plaintiff if uncapped.42 Proponents, however, most
frequently cite their concerns regarding the availability of insurance coverage and
rising insurance premiums or costs.43 This rationale is not surprising due to the
origins of the tort reform movement beginning in response to the alleged crisis for
rising healthcare costs.
However, the central rationale for imposing damage caps has had relatively
no effect on the insurance industry.44 Insurance industries have admitted that
capping damages has relatively no effect on insurance rates. 45 For example, the
American Institute of Insurance stated, “the insurance industry never promised that
tort reform would achieve specific premium savings” in a press release. 46 The
president of the American Tort Reform Association also admitted, “[w]e wouldn’t
tell you or anyone that the reason to pass tort reform would be to reduce insurance
rates.”47 Even though insurance insiders and the American Tort Reform Association
admit capping damages has relatively no effect on insurance rates, legislators
continue to list insurance costs as the primary purpose in enacting damage caps.48
In addition to attacking the tort reform’s insurance rationale for capping
noneconomic damages, opponents of the movement have stressed the importance
of awarding noneconomic damages to fully compensate the victim for physical
monetary harms as well as intangible harms.49 Noneconomic damages, such as
claims for pain and suffering or emotional distress, are just as real as economic
damages and caps should not prevent plaintiffs from getting full recovery.50
Treating noneconomic damages differently than economic damages reinforces the
notion that mental and emotional harms are not real. 51 In this day and age, it is
widely understood that emotional and mental harms can be just as harmful, if not
more harmful, than economic losses. Capping noneconomic harms and treating
these injuries as unimportant perpetuates the marginalization of emotional
trauma.

42. Martin, supra note 10, at 332; Effect of Tort Reform on Personal Injury Cases, ALL LAW,
https://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/effect-tort-reform.html (last visited on Sept. 1,
2021).
43. Martin, supra note 10, at 329–37; J. Chase Bryan et al, Are Non-Economic Caps
Constitutional?, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 154, 154 (2013).
44. Alexander Calaway, Idaho Noneconomic Damage Caps: Forty Years of Tort Liability Reform
and Constitutional Questions, 12 IDAHO CRIT. LEGAL STUD. J. 1, 11 (2018–2019).
45. CTR. JUST. & DEM., Fact Sheet: “Caps” Do Not Lower Insurance Premiums for Doctors (and
Insurance Insiders Admit It) (Apr. 12, 2011), https://centerjd.org/content/fact-sheet-caps-do-not-lowerinsurance-premiums-doctors-and-insurance-insiders-admit-it.
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. H.B. 583 Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Note, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020) (see
Statement of Purpose/Fiscal Note).
49. Martin, supra note 10, at 333–37.
50. See Haiduc, supra note 14, at 830 (“[N]oneconomic damages are as genuine as economic
damages.”).
51. Ruda, supra note 8, at 220.
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Limiting noneconomic damages also “hurt[s] those [who] already hurt the
most.”52 The noneconomic damage cap does not impact plaintiffs whose injuries
recover less than the cap.53 In fact, the majority of injuries probably do not reach
the capped limit. Thus, plaintiffs with lesser injuries are not affected. Consequently,
the cap only impacts those plaintiffs who have the most severe injuries – i.e., those
who are awarded noneconomic damages greater than the cap.54 The cap then
unfairly benefits tortfeasors who cause the most severe harm. Furthermore, a
tortfeasor who causes noneconomic harm less than the cap must pay in full,
whereas the tortfeasor who causes severe noneconomic harm greater than the cap
does not have to fully compensate the victim. Thus, noneconomic damage caps
benefit tortfeasors who cause severe harm at the expense of the victims suffering
that harm. Why should those who are already suffering the most bear the burden
of the noneconomic damage cap?
Caps on noneconomic damages also have an impact on settlement and pretrial negotiations. Proponents of tort reform argue that noneconomic damage caps
encourage settlement and reduce litigation costs.55 In fact, noneconomic damage
caps do typically increase the amount of cases settled outside of the courts.56 In a

52. Kurt Holzer, The Idaho Non-Economic Damages Cap: A Bad Idea, HEPWORTH HOLZER,
https://hepworthholzer.com/2019/01/28/idaho-non-economic-damages-cap/ (last visited Sept. 2,
2021).
53. See Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1116, 1120, 134 Idaho 465, 469 (2000) (an Idaho
noneconomic damage cap case where the plaintiffs argued against caps and stressed the fact that it only
impacts those with the most severe injuries: “I.C. § 6–1603 is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable
because it arbitrarily discriminates between slightly and severely injured plaintiffs, and between
tortfeasors who cause severe and moderate or minor injuries. The $400,000 cap on noneconomic
damages (adjusted for inflation) necessarily applies only to those cases where the plaintiff is severely
injured, thereby allowing full recovery for those plaintiffs who suffer moderate injuries, but denying a
full recovery to those who have suffered more severe injuries.”).
54. See, e.g., Estate of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894, 902 (Fla. 2014) (quoting Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1075 (Ill. 1997)) (an illustration of how noneconomic damage caps
impact those who are hurt the most and need the most compensation: “Plaintiff A is injured moderately,
and suffers pain, disability and disfigurement for a month. Plaintiff B is severely injured and suffers one
year of pain and disability. Plaintiff C is drastically injured, and suffers permanent pain and disability. For
purposes of this example, it is further assumed that a jury awards plaintiffs A and B $100,000 in
compensatory damages for noneconomic injuries. Plaintiff C receives $1 million for his permanent,
lifelong pain and disability. . . With respect to plaintiff C, [the noneconomic damage cap] arbitrarily and
automatically reduces the jury's award for a lifetime of pain and disability, without regard to whether or
not the verdict, before reduction, was reasonable and fair.”).
55. Ronen Avraham & Alvaro Bustos, The Unexpected Effects of Caps on Non-Economic Damages,
30 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 291 (2010), https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/ravraham/unexpected-effects-ofcaps.pdf.
56. Id.
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study that tested the effects of damage caps on settlement, not only did caps
encourage settlement, but the settlement amount for those negotiating under a
cap was less than half the amount awarded to uncapped negotiators. 57 In other
words, the study found that noneconomic damage caps increase settlement rates
while decreasing the amount of compensation awarded to plaintiffs. 58
Caps increase the settlement rate because they reduce the uncertainty of jury
verdicts and eliminate the possibility for a so-called windfall recovery.59 Since the
expected recovery at trial is limited by the cap, the parties are more likely to agree
on a settlement as opposed to costly litigation.60 Specifically, plaintiffs are more
likely to settle when a cap is in place because they are unable to gamble on the
possibility of receiving an expansive verdict from a jury trial.61 This greatly favors
defendants because they are able to presume lower trial verdicts, and therefore,
offer lesser amounts at settlement negotiations with a higher probability of
success.62
Lastly, caps on noneconomic damages disproportionately affect women,63
elderly,64 and low-income persons,65 in addition to the most seriously injured.66 For
instance, women are frequently awarded lower overall damages in comparison to
men due to a disparity in the valuation of economic damages.67 Economic damages
provide the most relief to higher wage earners.68 The valuation of economic
damages is often less for a female plaintiff due to a female plaintiff receiving lower
wages or no income at all.69 Thus, women often rely on noneconomic damages for

57. Linda Babcock & Greg Pogarsky, Damage Caps and Settlement: A Behavioral Approach, 28 J.
LEGAL STUD. 341, 363 (1999) (“The mean settlement amount was $182,098 for capped pairs and $490,129
for uncapped pairs.”).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 363, 368 (finding “strong evidence that a cap reduces uncertainty about the trial
outcome”); see also LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 10, at 153–58.
60. Avraham & Bustos, supra note 55 at 298.
61. Avraham & Bustos, supra note 55, at 298.
62. See Babcock & Pogarsky, supra note 57, at 368.
63. Finley, supra note 29, at 1266; Ruda, supra note 8, at 197.
64. Finley, supra note 29, at 1306 (“[E]lderly plaintiffs, have a much higher proportion of
noneconomic damages than general tort awards, so damage cap laws will disproportionately affect the
elderly.”); Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on
Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 ELDER L.J. 331, 335 (2006) (“Capping noneconomic damages is in
effect a death penalty for many elder abuse and mistreatment claims because the victims are unable to
find attorneys to represent them when noneconomic damages are downsized.”).
65. See Imrana Manzanares, Capping Statutes and their Constitutionality, 37 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS)
103, 106 (2006) (“[T]he cap discriminates against women, children, minorities, and low income workers,
who may not recover any (or minimal) lost wages, and therefore receive minimal economic damages.”).
66. See Holzer, supra note 52; Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1120–22, 134 Idaho at 469–71 and
accompanying text.
67. Ruda, supra note 8, at 231.
68. Finley, supra note 29, at 1280.
69. Ruda, supra note 8, at 231–32.

2022

IDAHO’S NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAP
ON WHISTLEBLOWERS: ADDING ANOTHER
CLAIM TO THE LIST OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CAPS IN IDAHO

327

compensation.70 For these reasons, caps on noneconomic damages significantly
affect women and their ability to recover as much as higher earning men.71
The discriminatory impact effecting women goes beyond wages. Many harms
suffered by female plaintiffs, such as sexual assault, reproductive harm, and
gynecological medical malpractice are largely alleged by women and compensated
with noneconomic damages.72 Thus, a cap on noneconomic damages for these
claims would unfairly limit recovery for female plaintiffs. Additionally, female
plaintiffs statistically receive a higher percentage of relief from noneconomic
damages compared to male plaintiffs. The average percent of a female plaintiff’s
damages are seventy-eight percent noneconomic and twenty-two percent
economic.73 On the other hand, the average percent of a male plaintiff’s damages
are forty-eight percent noneconomic and fifty-two percent economic.74 This
exemplifies the harmful effects noneconomic damage caps have on women. For
those reasons, the discriminatory impact of damage caps makes them unfair and
ill-advised.75
Damage caps act as a hindrance for plaintiffs with low economic damages,
specifically the disadvantaged groups described above, because lawyers may be
unwilling to take their case.76 Plaintiffs’ attorneys strategically screen cases to
determine whether they will be profitable.77 Since most plaintiff attorneys work on
a contingency fee basis, a cap on noneconomic damages might deter attorneys
from taking low economic damage cases with a cap on noneconomic damages. 78
This especially disadvantages plaintiffs with low economic damages, such as
women, children, the elderly, and minorities.79 Although damage caps reduce
unpredictable jury outcomes and increase settlement, caps overtly benefit the

70. Ruda, supra note 8, at 231–32.
71. Ruda, supra note 8, at 231–32.
72. Finley, supra note 29, at 1281.
73. Finley, supra note 29, at 1285.
74. Finley, supra note 29, at 1285.
75. Finley, supra note 29, at 1280.
76. In fact, the effect of damages caps may affect the willingness of plaintiffs'
attorneys to take high-value claims more than other claims, said Steven Garber and his
colleagues, because those cases are the most likely to be capped. If so, damages caps have
not only a general negative effect on access to justice by reducing attorneys willing to accept
contingency work but also the more specific and perverse effect of reducing the ability of the
most severely injured claimants to get representation. Scott DeVito & Andrew W. Jurs,
“Doubling-Down” for Defendants: The Pernicious Effects of Tort Reform, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV.
543, 557 (2014).
77. Sharkey, supra note 24, at 488–89.
78. DeVito & Jurs, supra note 76, at 556–57; see also ALL LAW, supra note 42.
79. Sharkey, supra note 24, at 489–90.
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defense, and again, harm the already injured plaintiff by reducing their access to
adequate representation.80
C. Tort Reform in Idaho
In Idaho, the legislature quickly showed support for the tort reform
movement. In 1975, Idaho introduced its first provision limiting noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice cases.81 However, a year later the cap was
constitutionally challenged82 and subsequently repealed.83 More than a decade
later, Idaho enacted the “Limitation on Noneconomic Damages Act,” section 61603, limiting noneconomic damages generally for tort liability to $400,000.84 The
new legislation differed from the previous damage cap, which imposed a limit on
one area of tort law, medical malpractice, in that it indiscriminately limited recovery
for all personal injury claims, including death and medical malpractice.85 The
constitutionality of section 6-1603 was upheld in 2000.86 After the Supreme Court
of Idaho upheld the cap’s constitutionality, the legislature amended the cap in 2003
substantially decreasing the cap to $250,000.87 However, this amount increases or
decreases each year “in accordance with the percentage amount of increase or
decrease by which the Idaho industrial commission adjusts the average annual
wage as computed pursuant to section 72-409(2), Idaho Code.”88 The yearly
adjustment to the cap has gradually increased the amount recoverable since it was
enacted.89
Moreover, the Idaho noneconomic damage cap has a means for the most
egregious cases to circumvent the cap. Section 6-1603(4) states that:
The limitation of awards of noneconomic damages shall not apply to:
(a) Causes of action arising out of willful or reckless misconduct. (b)
Causes of action arising out of an act or acts which the trier of fact finds

80. For example, in Eller v. Idaho State Police, Brandon Eller was awarded $1.5 million in
noneconomic damages and only $30,528.97 in economic damages. Eller, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147.
If a cap were in place, the incredible attorneys who were able to get him that enormous noneconomic
damage verdict might not have taken his case since economic damages were low.
81. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4204 to -4205 (repealed June 1981). The Hospital Liability Act limited
medical malpractice liability in an attempt to limit healthcare costs. Id.
82. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 404, 97 Idaho 859, 864 (1976). See also infra notes
140–51 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Jones case.
83. Id. §§ 39-4204 to -4205 (repealed 1981).
84. Id. § 6-1603 (amended 1987).
85. Id. § 6-1603(1).
86. Kirkland, 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464; see also infra notes 152–61 and accompanying text.
87. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (2003) (amending the maximum judgment amount to $250,000).
88. Id. § 6-1603(1).
89. IDAHO INDUS. COMM’N, NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES CAP (2021) https://iic.idaho.gov/non-economicdamages-cap/ (click the “Non-economic Damages Cap” PDF from the right-hand side menu).

2022

IDAHO’S NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAP
ON WHISTLEBLOWERS: ADDING ANOTHER
CLAIM TO THE LIST OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CAPS IN IDAHO

329

beyond a reasonable doubt would constitute a felony under state or
federal law.90
In other words, Idaho limits noneconomic damages in personal injury and
wrongful death cases, except where the tortfeasor acted recklessly or feloniously.91
If the tortfeasor acted recklessly or feloniously, then the plaintiff is eligible for
noneconomic damages exceeding the cap.92 In determining whether a tortfeasor
acted recklessly, such that the cap does not apply, a 2020 amendment added the
definition of “willful or reckless misconduct” to section 6-1601.93
This pathway around the noneconomic damage cap is necessary in order for
tortfeasors in the most egregious cases of personal injury or wrongful death to fully
compensate the victims of their actions and be held accountable. For example, the
statutory cap did not apply to noneconomic damages when the tortfeasor acted
recklessly in Hennefer v. Blaine County School District.94 In that case, the tortfeasor
was a school district driving instructor who ordered a new student driver to conduct
a three-point turn in a highway during hazardous conditions.95 During the threepoint turn, the car was struck by another vehicle on the highway and killed the
student driver.96 The Supreme Court of Idaho upheld the jury’s verdict of $3.5
million in noneconomic damages because the instructor acted recklessly, and thus,
the cap did not apply.97 Since the plaintiff could show the driving instructor acted
recklessly, and not merely negligently, the parents of the deceased student driver
were able to fully recover the jury verdict amount.98 The Hennefer case exemplifies
why Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap exception is an important addition for the
most egregious cases of personal injury, wrongful death, or medical malpractice.

90. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603; see Hennefer v. Blaine Cnty. School Dist., 346 P.3d 259, 158 Idaho 242
(2015) (Noneconomic damage cap did not apply in wrongful death action because driving instructor
acted recklessly when he instructed student driver to conduct a three-point turn in dangerous
conditions).
91. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1603(4).
92. See id.
93. Act of Mar. 24, 2020, ch. 294, § 1, 2020 Idaho Sess. Laws 846 (2020) (codified as amended at
IDAHO CODE § 6-1601(10)) (“’Willful or reckless misconduct’ means conduct in which a person makes a
conscious choice as to the person’s course of conduct under circumstances in which the person knows
or should know that such conduct both creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another and involves a
high probability that such harm will actually result.”).
94. Hennefer, 346 P.3d 259, 158 Idaho 242.
95. Id. at 246.
96. Id. at 246–47.
97. Id. at 248–56.
98. Id.
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D. The Constitutionality of Damage Caps
Opponents of the tort reform movement have challenged the
constitutionality of damage caps with varying success. The constitutionality of
damage caps has been challenged in almost every state in which damage caps are
enacted.99 In fact, only seven states with damage cap legislation have not
determined the constitutionality.100 Damage cap statutes are prohibited in four
states: Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania;101 repealed in three states:
Indiana,102 Maine103 and Minnesota;104 not enacted in eight states: Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and
Vermont;105 struck down in violation of the respective state’s constitution in twelve
states: Alabama,106 Florida,107 Georgia,108 Illinois,109 Kansas,110 Mississippi,111

99. Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 157–63.
100. See Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 157–63 (where Hawaii, Massachusetts, Montana, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming are undecided on the issue of constitutionality of
caps); see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-8.7 (1995) (regarding where the Supreme Court of Hawaii heard
oral arguments, but did not reach a decision, regarding the constitutionality of caps in Ray v. Kapiolani
Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569 (Haw. 2011)).
101. Bryan et al., supra note 43,4343 at 157–61.
102. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-14-1 to -5 (West 2021) (repealed Mar. 6, 1998).
103. ME. STAT. tit. 18-A, § 2-804 (repealed Sept. 1, 2019).
104. Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 160.
105. Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 158–62.
106. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1991) (medical malpractice cap on
noneconomic damages unconstitutional as violation of right to jury trial and equal protection clause).
107. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (showing noneconomic damage cap
unconstitutional as unnecessarily restrictive access to courts and right to jury trial); Estate of McCall, 134
So. 3d 894 (medical malpractice noneconomic damage cap unconstitutional as violation of equal
protection).
108. Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010) (showing
noneconomic damage cap for actions against medical facilities unconstitutional as violation of right to
jury trial).
109. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997) (showing noneconomic damage
cap in actions for wrongful death unconstitutional as special legislation and in violation of separation of
powers).
110. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019) (showing personal injury noneconomic
damage cap violates constitutional guarantee of the right to jury trial). This is the most recent challenge
on noneconomic damages and might be representative of a trend towards finding these caps
unconstitutional. See id.
111. Tanner v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., No. 111-0013, 2012 WL 7748580 (Miss. Cir. Oct. 22, 2012)
(finding a medical malpractice cap on noneconomic damages unconstitutional as violation of separation
of powers, right to trial by jury, right to court access and remedies clause of Mississippi Constitution, due
process and equal protection).
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Missouri,112 New Hampshire,113 Oklahoma,114 Oregon,115 Utah,116 and
Washington;117 and upheld as constitutional in nineteen states: Alaska,118
California,119 Colorado,120 Idaho,121 Louisiana,122 Maryland,123 Michigan,124

112. Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (finding a medical
malpractice cap on noneconomic damages unconstitutional as violation of right to trial by jury).
113. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232 (N.H. 1991) (finding a $875,000 cap on personal
injury noneconomic damages unconstitutional in violation of state equal protection clause).
114. Beason v. I.E. Miller Servs., Inc., 441 P.3d 1107 (Okla. 2019) (finding a noneconomic damage
cap on personal injury claims constitutes unconstitutional special legislation).
115. Busch v. McInnis Waste Sys., Inc., 468 P.3d 419 (Or. 2020) (finding a noneconomic damage
cap unconstitutional in violation of the state constitution’s remedy clause).
116. Smith v. United States, 356 P.3d 1249 (Utah 2015) (finding a medical malpractice cap on
noneconomic damages unconstitutional when applied to cases of wrongful death).
117. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989) (finding personal injury and
wrongful death actions noneconomic damage cap unconstitutional as violation of right to jury trial).
118. Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002) (finding a noneconomic damage
cap on personal injury and wrongful death facially constitutional).
119. Fein v. Permanente Med. Grp., 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985) (finding a noneconomic damage
cap in medical malpractice cases constitutional).
120. Scharrel v. Wal-Mart Stores, 949 P.2d 89 (Colo. App. 1997) (finding a noneconomic
damage cap constitutional).
121. Kirkland, 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464 (finding a noneconomic damage cap constitutional).
See infra notes 152–62 and accompanying text for analysis of the Kirkland case.
122. Oliver v. Magnolia Clinic, 85 So. 3d 39 (La. 2012) (finding a cap on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice constitutional).
123. Murphy v. Edmunds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992) (finding a cap on noneconomic damages in
personal injury constitutional).
124. Wiley v. Henry Ford Cottage Hosp., 668 N.W.2d 402 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003) (finding a cap
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice constitutional).
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Nebraska,125 New Mexico,126 Nevada,127 North Dakota,128 Ohio,129 South Dakota,130
Texas,131 Virginia,132 West Virginia, 133 and Wisconsin.134 The most recent decisions
from 2019, determining the constitutionality of damage caps, came out of North
Dakota and Kansas. These decisions demonstrate the split among courts because
North Dakota held its damage cap did not violate equal protection, whereas Kansas
held its damage cap violated the constitutional right to jury trial.135 A majority of
states have either prohibited, repealed, or struck down damage caps.
The constitutionality of damage caps has been challenged on several grounds.
The most frequent and successful constitutional argument against noneconomic
damage caps is that they violate the right to jury trial.136 In these cases, opponents
argue that the cap “disturb[s] the jury’s finding of fact on the amount of the award”
thus substituting “the Legislature’s nonspecific judgment for the jury’s specific
judgment,” which violates the right to trial by jury.137 Opponents have also
challenged the caps stating that they are impermissible special legislation or violate
equal protection and due process rights.138

125. Schmidt v. Ramsey, 860 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2017); Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist
Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43 (Neb. 2003) (finding a cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice constitutional).
126. Fed. Express Corp. v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1267 (D.N.M. 2002) (finding a cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice constitutional).
127. Tam v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 358 P.3d 234 (Nev. 2015) (finding a cap on medical malpractice
noneconomic damages did not violate right to jury trial).
128. Condon v. St. Alexius Med. Ctr., 926 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 2019) (finding a cap on damages for
medical malpractice did not violate equal protection).
129. Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007) (finding a cap on noneconomic
damages using sliding scale approach in tort actions constitutional).
130. Matter of Certification of Questions of L. from U.S. Ct. of Appeals for Eighth Cir., Pursuant
to Provisions of SDCL 15-24A-1, 544 N.W.2d 183 (S.D. 1996) (finding a cap on noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice could be constitutional).
131. Watson v. Hortman, 844 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (finding a cap on noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice constitutional).
132. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999) (finding a
cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice did not constitute unconstitutional special
legislation).
133. MacDonald v. City Hosp., Inc., 715 S.E.2d 405 (W. Va. 2011) (finding a cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice did not violate state’s constitution).
134. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund, 914 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 2019) (finding a
noneconomic damage cap on medical malpractice facially constitutional).
135. Compare Condon, 926 N.W.2d 136 with Hilburn, 442 P.3d 509.
136. Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 154; see also Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 524 (holding cap violates
right to jury trial).
137. Hilburn, 442 P.3d at 524.
138. Bryan et al., supra note 43, at 155; see also infra Part V (describing the merits of future
equal protection claims in Idaho).
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Idaho is one of fifteen states to uphold damage caps as constitutional. 139
However, the first case to discuss the constitutionality of noneconomic damage
caps in Idaho was Jones v. State Board of Medicine.140 That case analyzed the
constitutionality of Idaho’s first noneconomic damage cap on medical malpractice
claims.141 Although the court remanded, it expressly implied that the cap violated
equal protection.142 To determine whether the cap violated equal protection, the
court adopted a higher level of scrutiny, stating that “it is necessary to look beyond
the minimal scrutiny test” and called this higher scrutiny the “means-focus test.”143
The court went on to state that the appropriate test “scrutinizes the means by
which the challenged legislation is said to affect its articulated and otherwise
legitimate purpose[,]” and “where the discriminatory character of a challenged
statutory classification is apparent on its face and where there is also a patent
indication of a lack of relationship between the classification and the declared
purpose of the statute, then a more stringent judicial inquiry is required.” 144
The Jones Court held that the noneconomic damage cap on medical
malpractice claims created a discriminatory classification based on the degree of
injury and harms suffered. 145 Then it questioned whether the statute had any
reasonably conceived public purpose, and whether the apparently discriminatory
classification had a fair and substantial relation to the legislature’s objective and
purpose.146
Since the appellants argued the case on a minimal level of scrutiny standard,
the court remanded the case to the trial court to examine the purported correlation
between the statutory cap and the health care crisis with the appropriate higher
standard of review.147 Although the court remanded for further factual
determinations, it nonetheless questioned whether the health insurance crisis even
existed in Idaho.148 Using the “means-focus test,” the district court on remand held

139. See Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1116, 134 Idaho at 465.
140. Jones, 555 P.2d 399, 97 Idaho 859.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 411; see also Mark D. Perison, Equal Protection and Medical Malpractice Damage
Caps: The Health Care Liability Reform and Quality of Care Improvement Act of 1991, 28 IDAHO L. REV.
397, 410 (1992).
144. Jones, P.2d at 411, 97 Idaho at 871.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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the cap violated Idaho’s equal protection clause.149 After Jones, the legislature
repealed the medical malpractice cap and enacted a new cap on damages.150 For
over two decades, the court did not revisit the constitutionality of caps.151
The current noneconomic damage cap in Idaho, section 6-1603, was
constitutionally challenged in Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center.152 In
Kirkland, plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice suit for birth-related injuries suffered
by the mother and her newborn child.153 A jury awarded plaintiffs $15 million in
noneconomic damages for the injured child and $3.5 million in noneconomic
damages for the parents.154 Idaho’s damage cap law excessively limited the
plaintiff’s recovery on noneconomic damages to approximately $573,000. 155
Plaintiffs argued Idaho’s damage cap was unconstitutional and that it violated
the right to jury trial, constituted special legislation, and violated separation of
powers.156 Despite the Jones ruling implying a higher level of scrutiny for damage
caps, an equal protection challenge was not argued.157 In briefing, the parties
mentioned the presiding judge did not certify the equal protection issues raised on
appeal.158 The court did not consider the Jones holding or its dicta on equal
protection, and the noneconomic damage cap was upheld as constitutional for not
violating the right to jury trial,159 not constituting special legislation,160 and not
violating separation of powers.161

149. Jones v. State Bd. of Med., No. 55586 (4th Dist. Ct. Ada County, Idaho Nov. 3, 1980)
(unpublished); see also Edward W. Taylor & William G. Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical
Negligence Cases, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 837 (1982) (“When the ‘means focused’ test was applied in
1980 on remand to the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, the court found that the legislation
adopted did not substantially affect the availability of a liability insurance market and, therefore, was
unconstitutional based on equal protection grounds.”).
150. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4204, 39-4205 (West 2021) (repealed); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1603
(West 2021).
151. See Jones, 555 P.2d 399, 97 Idaho 859; see also Kirkland, 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464.
152. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1115, 134 Idaho at 464.
153. Id. at 1116–17, 134 Idaho at 465–66.
154. Id. at 1117, 134 Idaho at 466.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1116, 134 Idaho at 465.
158. Respondents’ Brief on Certified Questions of L. at 34, Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty Med. Ctr., 4
P.3d 1115, 1120; 134 Idaho 464, 469 (2000) (No. 26044), 2000 WL 34432920, at *34.
159. Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1117–20, 134 Idaho at 466–69 (plaintiffs were given jury trial, and the
legal consequences of jury verdicts are for the legislature and judiciary, thus no violation of right to jury
trial).
160. Id. at 1120–21, 134 Idaho at 469–70 (cap served the state’s legitimate interest in protecting
the availability of liability insurance thus the cap did not violate prohibition against special legislation).
161. Id. at 1121–22, 134 Idaho at 470–71 (legislature has the power to modify common law, and
the cap modifies common law of personal injury, thus did not violate separation of powers).
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The Supreme Court of Idaho was set to revisit the constitutionality of
noneconomic damage caps in a subsequent medical malpractice case in 2019.162 In
Ackerschott, the jury found, and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed, that the
urgent care facility’s treatment breached the standard of care and led to plaintiff’s
paraplegia.163 Accordingly, the jury awarded damages to the injured plaintiff and
his wife, which included noneconomic damages. 164 The jury-awarded damages,
however, were reduced by over a million dollars due to Idaho’s noneconomic
damage cap.165 The defendants appealed, and a stipulation was entered into by the
parties that reserved the right of the plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality of
the cap.166
On appeal, plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal alleging the noneconomic damage
cap, section 6-1603, is unconstitutional in violation of Idaho’s right to jury trial.167
The cross-appeal relied upon the successful constitutional challenge in Kansas from
2019168 and the importance of recognizing “that non-economic damages are as
important to the notion of justice and remedy of wrongs as economic damages.” 169
Although the plaintiffs strongly supported their cross-appeal and the parties
stipulated to give plaintiffs the right to challenge the cap, the court declined to
reach the merits of the constitutional claim on appeal.170 Instead of revisiting the
constitutionality of damage caps, the court refused to reach the merits of the claim,
and it was dismissed on a timeliness issue.171 The untimeliness issue gave the court
a free pass to avoid the debated constitutional claim. On speculation, the court
likely did not want to revisit the issue due to the controversial and political nature
of caps and gladly accepted the free pass.
Although the unsuccessful Kirkland challenge lays the foundation for the
constitutionality of noneconomic damage caps in Idaho, plaintiffs are still

162. See Ackerschott v. Mountain View Hosp., LLC, 457 P.3d 875, 166 Idaho 223 (2019).
163. Id. at 880–81, 166 Idaho at 228–29.
164. Id. at 881, 166 Idaho at 229.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Cross-Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5–10, Ackerschott v. Mountain View Hosp., LLC, 457 P.3d
875, 166 Idaho 223 (2020) (No. 46205), 2019 ID. S. CT. BRIEFS LEXIS 910, at *8–*18.
168. Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509, 524 (Kan. 2019) (This case was likely relied upon
because it is one of the most recent successful constitutional challenges. Furthermore, the language in
Kansas’s right to jury trial is similar to that of Idaho’s because both protect the right to jury trial as
“inviolate.”).
169. Cross-Appellants’ Reply Brief, supra note 167, at 9.
170. Ackerschott, 457 P.3d at 889, 166 Idaho at 237; see also Appellant's/Cross-Respondent's
Reply Brief at 22, Sommer v. Misty Valley, LLC, No. 48007, 2021 WL 6017844 (Idaho Dec. 21, 2021) (No.
48007), 2021 WL 2035285, at *22.
171. Ackerschott, 457 P.3d at 890, 166 Idaho at 238. Unfortunately, plaintiffs filed the applicable
motion a day later than the imposed deadline. Id.
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attempting to challenge the cap.172 The court in Ackerschott was able to avoid the
constitutional question of damage caps, but that leaves the opportunity for other
plaintiffs to raise the question in subsequent cases.173 Precedent held the cap
constitutional, but Idaho is not necessarily beholden to prior decisions that are
incorrect or unlawful. Additionally, a constitutional challenge on equal protection
grounds under the Jones “means-focus” test may merit greater success.174
To summarize, Idaho’s legislators put a cap on noneconomic damages to limit
the amount plaintiffs could recover in personal injury or wrongful death suits
following the tort reform movement.175 Idaho’s current noneconomic damage cap
was constitutionally challenged and upheld in Kirkland, and subsequently
challenged but dismissed in Ackerschotts.176 The noneconomic damage cap
challenged in those cases dealt with personal injury, medical malpractice, and
wrongful death claims.177 However, a recent Idaho Supreme Court case, Eller v.
Idaho State Police, made Idaho’s legislators assess the noneconomic damage cap in
regard to whistleblowers.178 After that case decided caps did not apply to
whistleblowers, legislators nonetheless decided to cap whistleblower claims as
well.179 The next section describes Idaho Tort Claims Act’s cap on noneconomic
damages and how the Supreme Court of Idaho decided no cap exists for
whistleblower’s noneconomic damages.
IV. ELLER V. IDAHO STATE POLICE
A whistleblower is someone who discloses, or “blows the whistle,” on an
employer’s conduct that is believed to be unlawful, corrupt, or harmful. 180
Whistleblowers play a role in encouraging transparency and accountability in the
workplace.181 But the threat of retaliation can silence these people from coming
forward. For example, a whistleblower who “sounded the alarm” about former
President Trump’s campaign with Ukraine played a major role in threatening his

172. Kirkland v. Blaine Cnty Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 1122, 134 Idaho 464, 471 (2000).
173. Ackerschott, 457 P.3d at 879, 166 Idaho at 227.
174. See infra Part V (analyzing the merits of future equal protection claims in Idaho); Jones, 555
P.2d at 412, 97 Idaho at 872.
175. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (2021).
176. Ackerschott v. Mountain View Hosp., LLC, 457 P.3d 875, 166 Idaho 223 (2020); Kirkland v.
Blaine Cnty. Med. Ctr., 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464 (2000).
177. Ackerschott, 457 P.3d at 879, 166 Idaho at 227; Kirkland, 4 P.3d at 1116–17, 134 Idaho at
465–66.
178. Eller v. Idaho State Police, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147 (2019); see infra Part III.
179. See infra Part III.
180. Why
We
Need
Whistleblower
Protections,
OPEN
SOCIETY
FOUNDS.,
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/why-we-need-whistleblower-protections
(last
updated Dec. 2019).
181. Id.
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presidency in the impeachment, but this came with a price. 182 When the former
president publicly named the whistleblower who came forward, he invited others
to retaliate against the whistleblower.183 In effect, publicly naming the
whistleblower and shaming him for coming forward with information discourages
public officials and public employees from using the appropriate avenues to report
wrongdoing.184 For this reason, statutory protections are in place to safeguard
whistleblowers.
Whistleblower statutes protect the rights of employees who “blow the
whistle” and are subsequently retaliated against. 185 These statutory protections for
whistleblowers are enacted in a majority of the states to provide legal remedies for
whistleblowing employees who experience retaliation. 186 Protections vary in the
degrees and ways in which they protect whistleblowers. For example, the most
common whistleblower statutes protect employees from retaliation against goodfaith whistleblowers in the public sector.187 Other jurisdictions may protect
whistleblowers in the private sector as well.188 On the other hand, a minority of
states have no statutory protections for whistleblowers.189
Like the majority of the states, Idaho has statutory protections for
whistleblowers in the public sector.190 The Idaho Protection of Public Employees Act
(the “Whistleblower Act”) provides “a legal cause of action for public employees
who experience adverse action from their employer as a result of reporting waste
and violations of a law, rule or regulation.”191 Under the Whistleblower Act, public

182. Bobby Allyn, Trump Criticized After Sharing Name of Alleged Whistleblower on Twitter, NPR
(Dec. 29, 2019, 6:15 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/29/792222297/trump-comes-under-fire-aftersharing-name-on-twitter-of-alleged-whistleblower.
183. See Neal Katyal (@neal_katyal), TWITTER (Dec. 27, 2019, 10:33 PM),
https://twitter.com/neal_katyal/status/1210810936904142849. Neal Katyal, former solicitor general
and now law professor at Georgetown University asked in a tweet, “[w]ho would want to live in a country
where its leader could just name the identity of a whistleblower and invite retaliation against him?” Id.
184. See Barb McQuade (@BarbMcQuade), TWITTER (DEC. 28, 2019, 11:35 AM),
https://twitter.com/BarbMcQuade/status/1211007877399351297. Barb McQuade is a law professor at
the University of Michigan Law School and tweeted, “[o]uting and shaming whistleblowers harms
national security by discouraging government officials from using official channels to report abuses.
Alternatives are leaks or, perhaps even worse, silence.” Id.
185. See Lois A. Lofgren, Whistleblower Protection: Should Legislatures and the Courts Provide a
Shelter to Public and Private Sector Employees Who Disclose the Wrongdoing of Employers?, 38 S.D. L.
REV. 316, 318 (1993).
186. Id. at 321–22.
187. Id. at 318.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-2101 (West 2021); see also Lofgren, supra note 185, at 320–23.
191. § 6-2101.
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employers cannot take adverse action against an employee who communicates
information in good faith for various reasons listed in the statute.192 A plaintiff must
bring a claim within 180 days of the retaliation under this act in order to obtain
relief.193 If the whistleblower is successful in bringing claims under this act,
recoverable remedies include damages or injunctive relief. 194 Prior to 2020, there
was no provision in the act capping noneconomic damages. 195
The Idaho Tort Claims Act also allows for a cause of action by government
employees seeking damages for their employer’s adverse actions. 196 But the ITCA
and Whistleblower Act contain conflicting provisions regarding damages. 197 Under
the ITCA, a plaintiff must bring an action within two years after the date the claim
arose, and damages are capped at $500,000 per occurrence. 198 The Idaho Supreme
Court determined how the competing acts apply to whistleblower cases in Eller v.
Idaho State Police.199
A. Facts of the Case
Eller is a case that arose out of a series of retaliatory adverse actions the Idaho
State Police took against one of its employees for testifying against another officer
in a court hearing.200 This case was significant because the plaintiff was able to
recover in full, without being limited by caps on noneconomic damages. 201
Brandon Eller was the lead reconstructionist from District 3 of the Idaho State
Police’s Crash Reconstruction Unit (CRU).202 In 2011, Brandon Eller was assigned to
conduct an investigation with other members of the CRU. 203 The investigation
centered around a crash that involved an on duty law enforcement officer, Payette
County Deputy Sloan, and that fatally injured the other driver. 204 The investigation
revealed Deputy Sloan caused the accident, and the reconstruction report was
reviewed and approved for filing. 205 However, top commanders in District 3
intervened and had the officers change some of the findings in the report. 206
Following the report, a felony vehicular manslaughter charge was brought against

192. IDAHO CODE § 6-2104 (2021).
193. IDAHO CODE § 6-2105(2) (2021).
194. Id.
195 . IDAHO CODE § 6-2105 (1994), amended by Act of Mar. 24, 2020, ch. 295, 2020 Idaho Sess.
Laws 295 (codified as amended at § 6-2105(5) (2021)).
196. IDAHO CODE § 6-911 (2021).
197. See IDAHO CODE § 6-2105 (2021); see also § 6-911.
198. § 6-911.
199. Eller v. Idaho State Police, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147 (2019).
200. Id. at 165, 165 Idaho at 151.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Eller, 443 P.3d at 165–66, 165 Idaho at 151–52.
206. Id. at 166, 165 Idaho at 152.
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Deputy Sloan.207 At trial, Brandon Eller and another CRU officer testified at the
preliminary hearing that Deputy Sloan drove in an unsafe reckless manner and that
they were told by commanding officers to remove some statements from the
reconstruction report. 208
Following Deputy Sloan’s trial, Idaho State Police retaliated in various ways
against Brandon Eller.209 For example, Brandon Eller was accused of lying on the
stand.210 He also received a downgrade in his performance review, affecting his
eligibility for a raise, and despite his previous near perfect reviews, was said to have
caused problems within District 3.211 As a result of the Deputy Sloan preliminary
hearings, Idaho State Police issued a new policy that required CRU officers to
destroy peer review reports.212 Brandon Eller questioned the legality of the
directive and refused to destroy peer review reports.213 This further amplified the
retaliation.214
Next, Idaho State Police placed Brandon Eller on patrol duties, including night
and weekend shifts, in addition to his reconstructionist duties even though he had
previously only worked day shifts.215 He was also notified that the police no longer
needed a CRU, and therefore, he was no longer needed as its supervisor. 216 As a
final blow, his application for pay increase was rejected, he was told he could no
longer teach reconstruction, and his application for Sergeant promotion was
halted.217 Believing these events were related to his whistleblowing, Brandon Eller
resigned and filed suit against the Idaho State Police under the Whistleblower
Act.218 He sought noneconomic damages for emotional distress in addition to
economic damages for lost wages.219
At trial, Brandon Eller testified about the extent of his emotional distress. 220
According to his wife’s testimony, Brandon Eller had a passion for his work and
dedicated his career to the CRU.221 Moreover, the retaliation had an effect on

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 166–67, 165 Idaho at 152–53.
210. Id. at 166, 165 Idaho at 152.
211. Eller, 443 P.3d at 166, 165 Idaho at 152.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 166–67, 165 Idaho at 152–53.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Eller, 433 P.3d at 166–67, 165 Idaho at 152–53.
218. Id. at 167, 165 Idaho at 153.
219. Id.
220. Id.; Appellant Brandon Eller’s Opening Brief at 12, Eller v. Idaho State Police, 433 P.3d 161,
165 Idaho 147 (2019) (No. 45699-2018), 2018 WL 4496256, at *12.
221. Appellant Brandon Eller’s Opening Brief, supra note 220, at 12.
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Brandon Eller’s relationships with his family, his emotional wellbeing, and his
physical wellbeing.222 In fact, he lost fifteen to twenty pounds, “had trouble
sleeping, headaches, started getting sick more often and ha[d] skin issues.”223
Brandon Eller successfully alleged unlawful retaliation and negligent infliction
of emotional distress.224 The jury awarded him $30,528.97 dollars in economic
damages under the Whistleblower Act and $1.5 million for negligent infliction of
emotional distress.225 Based on Idaho’s damages cap under the ITCA, the Idaho
State Police successfully moved to reduce Eller’s noneconomic damages to $1
million.226 Both parties appealed.227 On appeal, Brandon Eller argued the
Whistleblower Act allowed recovery of noneconomic damages and that no cap
applied.228
B. Idaho Supreme Court’s Holding
The Idaho Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether the Whistleblower
Act or the ITCA controlled Eller’s noneconomic damages on appeal. 229 The ITCA
authorizes claims against government employees but imposes a $500,000 cap on
damages for each occurrence.230 The court concluded that the Whistleblower Act is
more specific to whistleblower claims and should be applied over the ITCA following
statutory interpretation and legislative intent. 231 In other words, the whistleblower
law trumped the tort law which allows whistleblowers to recover uncapped
noneconomic damages—the jury can award whistleblowers for emotional distress.
The Whistleblower Act provides a remedy for all actual damages, including
damages for emotional distress claims, and does not cap damages in any way so
long as the claim arose within the 180-day window.232 Eller’s case was partially
remanded to determine his noneconomic damages for his claims of negligent
infliction of emotional distress solely under the Whistleblower Act. 233 The Idaho
State Police consequently settled the case for $1.3 million on August 29, 2019.234

222. Id. Eller’s wife testified that he was “grouchy,” “lost the skill to communicate about the
kids,” and “stopped cooking for the kids.” Id.
223. Id.
224. Eller, 443 P.3d at 167, 165 Idaho at 153.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 169, 165 Idaho at 155.
229. Id. at 168, 165 Idaho at 154.
230. Eller, 443 P.3d at 167, 165 Idaho at 153.
231. Id. at 169, 165 Idaho at 155.
232. Id. at 168, 165 Idaho at 154.
233. Id. at 178, 165 Idaho at 164.
234. Emma Nowacki, Bobbi Dominick & Gjording Fouser, CLE Presenters, Idaho State Bar
Employment & Labor Law Section CLE Presentation: What’s The Deal With All These Whistleblower
Cases? (Sep. 25, 2019), https://isb.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/EMP-Section-Meeting-Materialssept.-25-2019.pdf.
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C. Significance of Eller
Eller was an important case for whistleblowers in Idaho. It exemplified the
importance of noneconomic damages in the employment context and expanded
the scope of remedies under the Whistleblower Act. To illustrate the impact this
case had on public employees, Brandon Eller stated “[a]lthough this has been an
extremely stressful undertaking, I close this chapter knowing that the jury’s verdict
vindicated not just my rights, but the rights of every government employee in
Idaho.”235 Since ISP’s retaliatory conduct effected Brandon Eller monetarily as well
as emotionally, allowing him to recover economic damages and the full award of
emotional distress damages more fully compensated him for the actual damages
suffered.
This ruling incentivizes other whistleblowers to come forward with good faith
reports of wrongdoing by government officials, notwithstanding the risk of
retaliation and adverse treatment because claims of retaliation will be fully
compensated for. By refusing to cap verdicts in whistleblower cases, the court
furthers the Whistleblower Act’s goal of deterring retaliation and protecting
employees. This case serves as a warning to public employers. At a minimum, the
potential for expansive liability will dissuade public employers from engaging in
retaliation.
The Eller case also shows how important noneconomic damage claims are
specifically to whistleblowers. When most people think about damages for
emotional distress or pain and suffering, they think of personal injury, wrongful
death, or medical malpractice. However, a person’s claim for emotional distress in
employment law is just as valid. In fact, many studies have shown that joblessness
or other issues at work can lead to deterioration in mental health. 236 A person’s
work life directly correlates to their physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing.
Workplace retaliation may cause “tremendous stress, inconvenience, and financial
hardships for an employee.”237 These noneconomic harms should be compensated
just like any other economic harm. ISP’s retaliatory acts had an overwhelming
impact on Eller’s emotional wellbeing, and the court correctly acknowledged these
harms and adequately compensated him.238

235. Idaho Press Staff, ISP Resolves Whistleblower Lawsuit with Trooper, IDAHO STATE J. (Aug. 31,
2019),
https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/isp-resolves-whistleblower-lawsuit-withtrooper/article_ff562567-e31a-5005-9b62-873e4e10a482.html.
236. See generally Arthur H. Goldsmith et al., The Psychological Impact of Unemployment and
Joblessness,
25
J.
OF
SOCIOECONOMICS
333
(1996),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1053535796900098?via%3Dihub.
237. Tom Spiggle, Retaliating Employer Liable for Emotional Distress Under the FLSA, THE SPIGGLE
L. FIRM: SPLF EMP. BLOG (Dec. 27, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.spigglelaw.com/employmentblog/retaliating-employer-liable-emotional-distress-flsa/.
238. Eller, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147 passim.
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Although Brandon Eller’s case represented the importance of noneconomic
damages to compensate victims of emotional distress in the employment context,
239
the victory was short-lived. The extensive noneconomic relief Brandon Eller
received for his emotional distress will not be given to subsequent whistleblowers
seeking noneconomic damages.240 Following the case, Idaho legislators directly
responded to the case by enacting legislation to cap noneconomic damages for
whistleblowers.241 This response is analyzed in the following section.
V. NONECONOMIC DAMAGES FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS AFTER ELLER: HOUSE BILL
583
As previously established, the Idaho noneconomic damage cap and other
caps, such as the one in the ITCA, did not apply to whistleblowers under Eller.242 For
these reasons, the plaintiff in Eller was able to fully recover uncapped noneconomic
damages pursuant to his whistleblower claim. 243 The Idaho legislature, however,
was quick to change that.244 In March 2020, the Idaho State Legislature enacted
House Bill 583, severely limiting noneconomic damages for whistleblowers. 245 The
legislature’s response to cap these claims after the large uncapped verdict in Eller
leads to the question of whether it will similarly respond to large uncapped verdicts
in other areas of the law and cap those damages as well.
A. House Bill 583
House Bill No. 583 amends the Idaho Whistleblower Act, section 6-2105 of the
Idaho Code, to include a provision limiting damages an employee may recover:
“In no action brought pursuant to this chapter shall a judgment for
noneconomic damages be entered for a claimant exceeding the
limitation on damages contained in section 6-1603(1), Idaho Code. The
limitation contained in this subsection shall apply to the sum of
noneconomic damages sustained by a claimant. Governmental entities
and their employees shall not be liable for punitive damages on any
claim allowed under the provisions of this section.”246

239. Id.
240. Id.; see also IDAHO CODE § 6-2105(5)(a)-(c) (enacted H.B. 583, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess.
(Idaho 2020)).
241. § 6-2105(5)(a)–(c)
242. Eller, 443 P.3d at 161, 165 Idaho 147.
243. Id.
244. Act of Mar. 24, 2020, ch. 295, 2020 Idaho Sess. Laws 295 (codified as amended at IDAHO
CODE § 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) 2020)).
245. Id.
246. Id.
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Prior to enacting this legislation, there was no cap on whistleblower claims for
noneconomic damages.247 House Bill 583 therefore binds the Whistleblower Act to
the limitations set forth in Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap, section 6-1603(1),
and exempts government entities from punitive damages.248 It is important to note
that this bill does not give whistleblowers the opportunity to circumvent the cap in
cases involving reckless or felonious behavior under section 6-1603(2).249 The
limitations in section 6-1603(1) will effectively cap noneconomic damages
correlated to the annual wages of the state.250
Singling out whistleblower claims and capping their noneconomic damages
is somewhat unusual. Some states with whistleblower statutes cap noneconomic
damages pursuant to the state’s general noneconomic damage caps on torts. 251
Other states allow whistleblowers to recover noneconomic damages in full without
a cap.252 Idaho is one of the only states, if not the only state, that singles out
whistleblowers in the whistleblower statute capping their damages.
B. Legislature’s Purpose for Capping Whistleblower Damages
The legislature enacted House Bill 583 in order to directly address and respond
to the ruling in Eller that “there was no cap on damages for public whistleblower
claims.”253 Stephen M. Kohn, one of the nation’s leading whistleblower
attorneys,254 stated that “awarding whistleblowers damages for emotional distress

247. See Eller, 443 P.3d at 168, 165 Idaho at 154.
248. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) (enacted H.R. 583, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020)).
249. See supra Part V for an analysis of how the cap unfairly prejudices whistleblowers by not
affording them with the ability to override the cap.
250. IDAHO CODE § 6-1603 (1987); see supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. In 2019, the
cap was set at $372,865.27. IDAHO INDUS. COMM’N, supra note 89.
251. See Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, 305 So. 3d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019); see also Jeffrey D.
Slanker & Michael P. Spellman, Florida Appellate Court Says Noneconomic Compensatory Damages are
Available in FPWA, 31 NO. 7 FLA. EMP. L. LETTER 2 (Sept. 2019) (The Florida court in Iglesias ruled similarly
to Idaho in Eller and held that claims under Florida Public Whistleblower Act were not subject to a
statutory cap.).
252. See McGill v. Univ. of S.C., 423 S.E. 2d 109, 112 (S.C. 1992) (similar to the Eller case, here
the court held that the damages awarded under the state whistleblower act could not be capped by the
state tort claim act); see also Bailets v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 181 A.3d 324, 326 (Pa. 2018) (whistleblowing
plaintiff’s award of $1.6 million in noneconomic damages was upheld and not excessive).
253. IDAHO STATE LEGISLATURE, SINE DIE REPORT 11 (2020), https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/sessioninfo/2020/sinedie.pdf.; see also Justin Ruen, AIC Legislative Update: March 6,
2020,
ASS’N
OF
IDAHO
CITIES:
AIC
BLOG
(Mar.
6,
2020),
https://idahocities.org/blogpost/1235530/341942/AIC-Legislative-Update-March-6-2020.
254. About Page of Stephen M. Kohn, KOHN, KOHN & COLAPINTO LLP, https://kkc.com/ourwhistleblower-law-firm/our-whistleblower-lawyers/stephen-m-kohn/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2021).

344

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

has been shown to encourage others to come forward with crucial information
about fraud and misconduct” and thus, whistleblower lawsuits likely would have
surged after the Eller case.255 However, by responding to the case ten months after
the decision, the legislature did not give whistleblowers in Idaho a chance to come
forward before enacting the bill capping their damages.256 The ruling in Eller
signified that public employees’ claims of retaliation are valid and can reap
extensive rewards.257 House Bill 583, on the other hand, does not encourage
whistleblowers to come forward.258 In fact, it might do just the opposite.
Some of the Idaho legislators stated their rationale for enacting these caps.
The bill’s sponsor, Representative Greg Chaney, stated that “the bill is an attempt
to strike a balance between protecting the rights of whistleblowers to report
legitimate claims of waste, fraud and abuse, and protecting Idaho taxpayers.” 259
Senator Kelly Anthon also commented on the bill stating that “the legislation
balanced the responsibility the state has to protect whistleblowers who report
wrongdoing, while also protecting Idaho taxpayers,” and that the bill “protects the
Idaho taxpayer from judgments of the courts that are without limits and that
become punitive in nature.” 260 According to these legislators, the bill’s main
purpose was to protect whistleblowers and taxpayers.261 However, while this
legislation may protect Idaho taxpayers, it inadvertently benefits public employers
at the expense of punishing its employees.
C. An Alternative Approach: Encourage Whistleblowing and Implement Training
Procedures
Instead of capping noneconomic damages for whistleblowers, the legislature
should allow whistleblowers to recover in full so that employers know not to
retaliate against employees who blow the whistle. The legislature should encourage
good faith whistleblowing because it holds public entities accountable for their
wrongful actions. Capping whistleblower damages, however, does the exact
opposite. By limiting the amount recoverable for the emotional effects of
retaliation, the legislature’s cap effectively limits an employee’s incentive to blow
the whistle on their employer. The purpose of whistleblower statutes is to balance

255. Maya Efrati, Amicus Brief Filed in Support of Idaho State Police Whistleblower,
WHISTLEBLOWER
NETWORK
NEWS
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://whistleblowersblog.org/2018/10/articles/whistleblower-news/amicus-brief-filed-in-support-ofidaho-state-police-whistleblower/.
256. See Eller v. Idaho State Police, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147 (Idaho 2019); see also H.R. 583,
65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2020).
257. See Eller, 443 P.3d 161, 165 Idaho 147.
258. Idaho H.R. 583.
259. Justin Ruen, AIC Legislative Update: March 6, 2020, ASS’N OF IDAHO CITIES: AIC BLOG (Mar. 6,
2020), https://idahocities.org/blogpost/1235530/341942/AIC-Legislative-Update-March-6-2020.
260. Keith Ridler, Inside the Statehouse: Bill Limiting Idaho Whistleblower Lawsuits Heads to
Governor, IDAHO NEWS 6, https://www.kivitv.com/news/bill-limiting-idaho-whistleblower-lawsuitsheads-to-governor (Mar. 19, 2020, 10:54 AM).
261. Id.
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the interests of employers, employees, and the public. By capping whistleblower
damages, however, the purpose of the whistleblower statute weighs in favor of the
employer.
Capping whistleblower damages might reduce Idaho taxes, but it ignores the
actual problem at hand. The actual problem, or triggering event, is wasting
government resources or violating the law. That is the problem that Idaho should
be trying to prevent. Idaho taxes would not rise due to whistleblower litigation if
whistleblowers did not have to report wrongdoing in the first place. Instead of
capping whistleblower damages, the legislature should attempt to prevent
wrongful conduct from occurring and making sure the government workforce is one
that does not waste government resources or violate the law.
Furthermore, the legislature could alternatively protect Idaho taxpayers by
implementing training procedures to reduce the possibility of retaliation. If
employers know that their adverse actions will be recognized in full by the justice
system and cost a lot of money, then they will be encouraged to set forth training
programs to avoid liability. Government training programs that educate employers
on how to avoid whistleblowing violations and discourage retaliation against
whistleblowers for reporting such conduct should be implemented as opposed to
capping damages. If programs are set in place training public employers on how to
avoid whistleblowing violations, retaliation, and subsequent liability, then
whistleblowing claims would decrease. Thus, the legislature’s goal of protecting
Idaho taxpayers and whistleblowers will be more effective through training and
uncapped liability.
D. Harmful Effects of the Noneconomic Damage Cap on Whistleblowers
The noneconomic damage cap imposed on whistleblowers should not have
been enacted. The cap protects Idaho taxpayers at the expense of whistleblowers
and the general public. Similar to other noneconomic damage caps, House Bill 583
punishes those with the most egregious harms who have otherwise meritorious
claims for relief.262 Noneconomic damages are an important piece of compensatory
damages, and in most instances, noneconomic damages are necessary to return the
plaintiff to their rightful position.263 If a whistleblower has noneconomic damages
greater than the cap, then they will never recover to their rightful position because
the cap reduces the amount they should receive to the capped amount. Therefore,
the goal of compensatory damages—to return the whistleblower to their rightful
position—is not satisfied when the harm exceeds the cap.
Prospectively, the cap for whistleblowers will also have harmful effects on
settlement, disproportionately effect women, and reduce a whistleblower’s access
to adequate representation. These harmful effects are similar to the effects caps

262. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.

346

IDAHO LAW REVIEW

VOL. 58

have on other claims.264 Similar to the settlement rate of other capped claims, the
settlement rate for whistleblower cases will likely increase and fewer cases will go
to trial.265 However, this means that settlement negotiations will favor defendants
and yield smaller settlement awards for whistleblowers.266
This cap will have a discriminatory effect on women. 267 Unfortunately, women
have historically received smaller wages compared to their male counterparts. 268
Economic damages for whistleblowers are largely calculated by determining lost
wages.269 Since women have historically been given fewer wages, they must rely on
noneconomic damages more frequently to recover. 270 This cap will
disproportionately hurt women by reducing their damages.
The cap will also decrease the value of whistleblower cases and make it harder
for plaintiffs with low economic damages to find adequate representation willing
to take their case. For example, in Eller the whistleblower only received $30,528.97
in economic damages.271 Pursuant to the new legislation capping noneconomic
damages, Brandon Eller might not have been able to find adequate representation
willing to take his case due to his relatively low value of economic damages and
capped noneconomic damages.
Most importantly, whistleblowers play a critical role in exposing government
waste, financial fraud, and other wrongdoings. Blowing the whistle on your
employer is a difficult decision that takes tremendous courage and strength,
because whistleblowing can lead to hostility, mistreatment, and retaliation at work.
Government employees should be encouraged to speak up about improper
government conduct.
In reality, it is in the public’s best interest to know about government
misconduct. However, this cap disincentivizes whistleblowing. When
whistleblowing is disincentivized, government waste and other misconduct might
go undetected harming the general public. Whistleblowers will have to decide

264. See supra Part III Section B notes 35–76 and accompanying text for the harmful effects of
noneconomic damage caps on claims other than whistleblowers.
265. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text for effects of settlement on personal injury
and wrongful death caps.
266. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text for effects of settlement on personal injury
and wrongful death caps.
267. See supra notes 63–75 and accompanying text for the discriminatory effect caps have on
women.
268. See Rong Shi, Kerenssa Kay & Ravi Somani (@WorldBank), MEDIUM, 5 Facts About Gender
Equality in the Public Sector, MEDIUM: WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY (Mar. 14, 2019),
https://medium.com/world-of-opportunity/5-facts-about-gender-equality-in-the-public-sectore66c50c3c743; see also Research & Data: The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap, AAUW,
https://www.aauw.org/resources/research/simple-truth/ (last visited May 27, 2022).
269. Economic damages are calculated by monetary losses. Lisa M. Ruda, Caps on Noneconomic
Damages and the Female Plaintiff: Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197, 199 (1993).
Thus, lost wages are a major source of economic damages in the employment law context.
270. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
271. Eller, 443 P.3d at 165, 165 Idaho at 151.
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between blowing the whistle on their employer, risking retaliation, and not being
fully compensated, or staying silent letting the improper conduct continue. Only
time will tell whether Idaho whistleblowers will be silenced due to this new
legislation.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE NONECONOMIC DAMAGE CAPS IN
IDAHO
Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap, 6-1603, has been constitutionally
challenged and upheld.272 However, numerous states have struck down their
noneconomic damage cap since that challenge. 273 A subsequent constitutional
challenge in Idaho that relies on those cases has the potential to yield a different
result. Although another constitutional challenge focusing on the right to jury trial
might be successful, I am going to focus my analysis on the merits of equal
protection challenges.
Idaho’s first noneconomic damage cap was challenged on equal protection
grounds in Jones.274 The Jones Court implied the level of scrutiny for such cases
would be heightened beyond minimal scrutiny using a “means-focus” test.275 The
current noneconomic damage cap was challenged in Kirkland.276 That court,
however, did not consider the dicta implicating higher scrutiny from Jones or
whether the statutory cap was in violation of equal protection. 277 The legislature
amended the cap after Kirkland and added whistleblowers to the claimants affected
by the cap.278 Thus, the current cap should be challenged again, but this time, on
equal protection grounds in addition to other constitutional claims.
Noneconomic damage caps in other states have been struck down as
unconstitutional in violation of equal protection.279 For example, the Florida
Supreme Court, using rational basis review, held that a statutory cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases violates the right to equal
protection under Florida’s constitution because it discriminated against claimants

272. See Kirkland, 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464.
273. See Hilburn v. Enerpipe Ltd., 442 P.3d 509 (Kan. 2019).
274. See Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 403, 97 Idaho 859, 863 (1976); see also supra
notes 135–45 and accompanying text.
275. Id. at 407, 97 Idaho at 867.
276. See Kirkland, 4 P.3d 1115, 134 Idaho 464; see also supra notes 146–55 and accompanying
text.
277. Id.
278. See IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) (enacted H.B. 583, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2020)).
279. See Est. of McCall v. United States, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014). See also Ferdon ex rel.
Petrucelli v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005) for analysis of noneconomic damage
caps violating equal protection.
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who suffer the “most grievous injuries” and “no rational basis exists (if it ever
existed) between the cap . . . and any legitimate state purpose.” 280 Thus, the court
in Florida was able to strike down a damage cap using the minimal scrutiny, rational
basis.281
The Florida court exemplified the discriminatory effects damage caps have on
plaintiffs with the most severe injuries by explaining how moderately injured
plaintiffs recover in full when their injuries are awarded less than the cap. However,
severely injured plaintiffs awarded damages greater than the cap are unable to
recover in full because their damages are reduced to the capped amount.282
Additionally, the State’s purpose for enacting the cap—reducing insurance
premiums—was not rationally related because there was absolutely no correlation
between them.283 For these reasons, the court held noneconomic damages violate
equal protection even under minimal scrutiny.284
In Idaho, a plaintiff subject to the cap could challenge the noneconomic
damage cap on equal protection grounds and make an argument similar to that of
the Florida Supreme Court. Unlike Florida, where the court used the minimal level
of scrutiny,285 the Idaho Supreme Court in Jones gave heightened scrutiny to
noneconomic damage challengers.286 Since the Florida court was able to strike
down noneconomic damages under rational basis, the challenger here should be
able to strike down noneconomic damages more easily if they are afforded
heightened scrutiny.
Similar to the Florida argument, the Idaho challenger would examine the
legislature’s purpose—such as alleviating insurance costs for personal injury
plaintiffs or reducing Idaho taxes for whistleblowing plaintiffs—and argue that the
proposed purpose is not related to the statute. As previously discussed and
vindicated in the Florida case, tort reform has not alleviated rising insurance
costs.287 For instance, the Jones court wondered whether there was ever an
insurance or healthcare crisis at all.288 Thus, there is no correlation between capping
noneconomic damages and the legislature’s purpose, which has allegedly been to
address the insurance crisis.
In regard to whistleblowers, the challenger could argue that there is no
correlation between Idaho taxes, whistleblower damages, and the statute.
However, this argument does not have as much statistical support to back it up
since Idaho is one of the only states that caps whistleblower damages.289
Nonetheless, regardless of whether a personal injury, wrongful death, medical

280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Est. of McCall, 134 So.3d at 914.
Id. at 901.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 910.
Id. at 901.
See Est. of McCall, 134 So. 3d 894 (Fla. 2014).
See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 97 Idaho 859 (1976).
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Jones, 555 P.2d at 412, 97 Idaho at 872.
See Iglesias v. City of Hialeah, 305 So. 3d 20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019).
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malpractice, or whistleblowing plaintiff gets the opportunity to challenge Idaho’s
noneconomic damage cap, the plaintiff should take the opportunity to challenge it
on equal protection grounds. If a plaintiff is able to challenge caps on equal
protection grounds, it will be interesting to see whether the Jones heightened
scrutiny test is applied, and whether the legislature’s purpose for enacting these
statutes survives the Jones test.
A whistleblowing plaintiff also has an additional equal protection argument.
House Bill 583 limits these claims to section 6-1603(1) of Idaho’s noneconomic
damage cap.290 However, it does not afford whistleblowers the avenue around the
cap under section 6-1603(4).291 Under section 6-1603(4) of the Idaho noneconomic
damage cap, plaintiffs with personal injury, wrongful death, and medical
malpractice claims are not subject to the cap if the tortfeasor acted recklessly or
feloniously.292
Allowing some plaintiffs an avenue around the cap but not offering the same
opportunity to whistleblowers has a discriminatory impact. This favors victims of
personal injury, wrongful death, and medical malpractice. It also unfairly benefits
defendants to whistleblower actions. The cap allows the government and its
employees to recklessly or feloniously retaliate against whistleblowers without any
further expense, whereas other tortfeasors who act recklessly or feloniously must
pay noneconomic damages in full.293
For these reasons, this bill could be challenged on equal protection grounds.
This argument, however, is not particularly strong. In an equal protection analysis,
the court identifies the classification being challenged, the standard to test the
classification, and whether the standard has been met. 294 The equal protection
clause is “designed to ensure that those persons similarly situated with respect to
a governmental action [are] treated similarly.”295 Not affording whistleblowing
plaintiffs the same avenue around the cap as other plaintiffs could be challenged as
discriminatory in violation of Idaho's equal protection clause. However, in order to
challenge the whistleblower cap as discriminatory, the whistleblowing plaintiffs and
other plaintiffs must be similarly situated.296

290. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) (2020) (enacted H.B. 583, 65th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2020)); see supra notes 66–74 and accompanying text.
291. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) (2020).
292. Hennefer v. Blaine Cnty. Sch. Dist., 346 P.3d 259, 265, 158 Idaho 242, 248 (2015); see supra
notes 94–98 and accompanying text (explaining plaintiffs’ recovery was not capped because defendant’s
conduct was reckless).
293. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-2105(5)(a)–(c) (2020).
294. State v. Rome, 368 P.3d 660, 663, 160 Idaho 40, 43 (2016).
295. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, 52 P.3d 307, 314, 137 Idaho 663, 670 (2002) (citing
State v. Hayes, 700 P.2d 959, 108 Idaho 556 (Ct. App. 1985)).
296. Id.
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It could be argued that whistleblowing plaintiffs are similarly situated to other
plaintiffs because they are both subject to Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap.
However, this classification of plaintiffs might not be sufficiently “similarly
situated.”297 For instance, whistleblowing plaintiffs cannot hold individual agents of
the government employer liable while other plaintiffs subject to the caps are able
to hold individual tortfeasors liable.298
When courts evaluate reckless or felonious conduct for purposes of the cap,
they analyze the level of the tortfeasor’s intent. Personal injury, wrongful death,
and medical malpractice cases analyze the level of the tortfeasor’s intent to
determine whether the tortfeasor should be liable.299 Those types of cases also
determine whether the tortfeasor acted negligently, recklessly, or feloniously.300
However, the whistleblower act does not examine the level of intent when the
employer retaliates against an employee that blew the whistle. 301 Thus, the level of
intent examined in other cases is not examined in whistleblower cases.
Whistleblower cases and plaintiffs are sufficiently different from other cases and
plaintiffs subject to the cap. If whistleblowing plaintiffs are not similarly situated to
other plaintiff subject to the cap, then this argument will fail.
However, even if this argument fails to violate the constitution, it still unfairly
prejudices whistleblowers. If the legislature is going to impose a cap on
whistleblower claims under Idaho’s noneconomic damage cap, it should afford
whistleblowing plaintiffs the same exceptions under section 6-1603(4) as other
plaintiffs. Even though whistleblower claims do not look at the tortfeasor’s level of
intent,302 the legislature should allow plaintiffs to examine a tortfeasor’s intent in
order to circumvent the cap for particularly egregious retaliatory actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Noneconomic damage caps directly oppose the goal of compensatory
damages, which is to put the plaintiff back in their rightful position. In addition to
opposing the goal of compensatory damages, noneconomic damage caps are
unconstitutional and limit recovery for otherwise meritorious claims for relief.
Damage caps have a harmful effect on settlement discussions, disproportionately
effect women, and disincentivize attorneys from taking these cases. In addition to
those reasons, caps do not alleviate the problems they were set to resolve. Thus,
caps should be challenged again in Idaho for violating equal protection in addition
to the right to jury trial. If a plaintiff is able to follow the Jones precedent and receive
heightened scrutiny, then an equal protection challenge will be difficult to beat.
For whistleblowers, the Eller case was a major decision because it expanded
the scope of remedies under Idaho’s whistleblower act. The legislature undermined
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this decision when it enacted House Bill 583 limiting the scope of damages under
the act. The legislature should reconsider its decision to cap whistleblower damages
because it has extremely harmful effects on whistleblowing plaintiffs and the
general public. Due to the importance of whistleblowers, the legislature should
encourage whistleblowing instead of protecting the State from expensive litigation.
Only time will tell whether the cap amount will dissuade municipalities from
retaliating, whether the legislature will reconsider its decision to cap whistleblower
claims, and whether an upcoming challenger will render the noneconomic damage
cap in Idaho unconstitutional.

